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Abstract
Poaching key employees from close competitors has become a prevalent and contro-
versial issue. This paper examines the condition under which employee poaching can
be either predatory or competitive, and discusses its implications for the enforcement
of post-employment non-compete agreements. When poaching suﬃciently injures the
entrant’s ability to compete, predatory hiring can occur in the sense that the incum-
bent would have been unprofitable in the absence of the entrant’s exit. Some antitrust
implications are discussed.
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1 Introduction
“Employee poaching” or “employee raiding” refers to the situation in which a firm targets
and hires the key employee(s) of a close competitor. Such employee defection has been a
popular concern in a variety of occupations and industries from Silicon Valley to Wall Street.
Besides the high-profile cases in the media spotlight, the case law shows that recruiting
wars between competitors has become prevalent.1 In post-employment lawsuits, some anti-
competitive concerns have been raised regarding this type of job-hopping as the following
quote indicates:
The SAP lawsuit against the leading front oﬃce software maker was filed in a
Pennsylvania state court last November. SAP alleged that Siebel engaged in
“predatory hiring practices directed at SAP and unfair competition designed
to injure SAP’s business and damage SAP’s ability to compete with Siebel,”
according to a statement released at the time of the filing. SAP alleged that
Siebel unfairly hired 27 of its key employees, including the president [and CEO]
of SAP [America], the company’s senior vice president of Latin American sales,
the vice president for corporate communications, and a host of others from the
sales, product and technology units. (CNET News, March 17, 2000)2
1Stone (2001) and Whitmore (1990) show that the number of court decisions involving post-employment
non-compete agreements has increased over the last few decades.
2To name a few more cases, in 1997 Microsoft raided Borland by luring away 34 key development personnel;
in 1999 Amazon hired away Wal-Mart’s executives as its chief information and logistics oﬃcers; in 2001 and
2005, respectively, Microsoft sued when its executives were hired away as CEO of Crossgain and the head
of Google’s Chinese operation; and in 2007 Amvescap sued when Deutsche Bank lifted out a team of bond
managers and analysts.
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Key employees often enter into employment contracts with non-compete clauses or coven-
ants not to compete (henceforth CNC). An employee with this type of contract cannot be
hired by a firm that competes with his previous firm based on criteria such as geographical
area or a certain period of time after the employment relationship is terminated.3 Thus,
if another firm hires away its key employees, the employer can pursue litigation against
defecting employees. In some cases, the parties settle out of court, but in others the courts
issue or deny an injunction that prevents the former employee from taking the new job or
working on specific tasks.
The courts’ aim is to find the optimal enforcement that balances the legitimate business
interests of the employer, such as the protection of confidential information, and the eco-
nomic freedom of the employee, such as the right to choose employers. In most states, the
courts have adopted the “rule of reason” approach based on common law to determine the
enforceability of CNCs.4 However, states tend to enforce CNCs diﬀerently. For example,
California has legislated a public policy that nullifies CNCs with only a few exceptions, and
this has caused raiding firms to use the California court as a shield.5
From an economic perspective, poaching a rival’s high-level executives or highly trained
specialists poses a serious threat to the original employer because the defection of key em-
ployees not only benefits the poaching firm, it also inflicts substantial damage to the initial
3Even if an employee has never signed a non-compete agreement, the ‘inevitable disclosure doctrine’ can
serve as a de facto CNC. That is, the court can enjoin the former employee from competing for the reason
that he would inevitably use the proprietary knowledge gained at the previous employment for the benefit
of the competitor.
4The courts usually require reasonable terms both in time and space in order for such covenants to be
considered. Covenants are typically no longer than two years, however, this is considered enough time to
make the employee’s cutting-edge skills obsolete in high-tech industries (Gilson 1999).
5California Business and Professions Code 16600 says that "every contract by which anyone is restrained
from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void."
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employer. That is, when the supply of top talent is scarce, job turnover can directly aﬀect
market competition between firms. Thus, in an oligopoly poaching can be used as a strategic
tool to injure a competitor’s business. This paper addresses how the courts should consider
the CNC enforcement issue in light of these implications.
More specifically, we show that poaching can indeed drive a rival from the market. We
first present the basic argument in a perfect information model along the lines of “raising the
rival’s costs” argument. We then extend the model into an uncertain environment, which is a
variant of signaling models of predation. The key concept in our approach is the worker-firm
match quality, which has been extensively used in the labor economics literature to explain
non-strategic turnover in general. The idea in its simplest form is that workers may move to
a better-matched firm absent any costs associated with the searching and matching process.
The incumbent’s poaching can raise the entrant’s costs because the entrant is left with
a replacement worker who is second best. If the entrant incurs additional costs due to less
eﬃcient personnel, then this has an important implication for the incumbent’s strategic
poaching decision. That is, the entrant can be forced out of the market due to ineﬃciencies
even though the poaching action would have been unprofitable for the incumbent were it
not for the entrant’s exit. Under imperfect information, the problem becomes exacerbated
because a less well-matched incumbent can pretend to be a high type, so that the entrant is
driven out of the market more often.
The claim that companies poach key employees in order to injure or drive out competi-
tors has been put forth in various court cases, but surprisingly the courts have been very
conservative on such claims in the case development. Since predatory hiring as well as com-
petitive poaching incentives coexist, enforcement of non-compete covenants may help reduce
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the parameter range in which predation occurs. We find that monetary awards are irrelevant
to this range as long as firms internalize this transfer into wage bidding. An injunction, how-
ever, restricts the new match, thus, selective enforcement can reduce the range of predatory
hiring.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the relevant literature in
the next section. Section 3 presents and analyzes the model. Section 4 discusses the CNC
enforcement issue. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The literature on labor turnover or job mobility is extensive. Most research has used job
matching models of the sort found in Jovanovic (1979). There is a subset of this literature
that specifically deals with employee poaching. Poaching is more relevant in the market for
highly skilled workers, where the workers are courted away by outside firms. This process
is diﬀerent from a random-search model in that the labor pool is heterogeneous and in
short supply. Also, this market is unlikely to suﬀer from the “lemons” problem as in the
second-hand labor market (Greenwald 1986) because the workers are targeted and sought
after.
Lazear (1986) explains why the best workers are stolen away by rivals. In essence, em-
ployee poaching occurs when the worker is more valuable to the raiding firm. This occurs
when the worker’s firm-specific skills have a negative value at the current place of employ-
ment. When the two firms are both informed about the worker’s productivity, the outside
firm is willing to oﬀer a higher wage, and the current employer chooses not to match the
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oﬀer. In our model, however, it is also possible that a less well-matched firm poaches the
rival’s key employees due to the strategic incentive to induce exit.
More recently, Boschmans and Bouckaert (2004) use the distribution of the workers’
switching costs to explain poaching. In their model, workers are equally productive at both
firms, but the outside firm can profitably poach those with relatively low switching costs.
Banerjee and Gaston (2004) assume that the external labor market receives a noisy signal of
the worker’s productivity, and show that, when making counteroﬀers is costly, the employer
adopts a pooling wage and thus exposes some of its better workers to the risk of being hired
away by the outside firm.
Despite popular concerns over predatory hiring, strategic models in labor markets have
not received much attention in the literature. Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) examine the
related issue of employee preemption.6 They show that an employer can oﬀer its better-
matched workers a preemptively high wage that deters others from bidding wages. This is
because the outside firm must incur a fixed cost to assess its match quality with the potential
employee, which is not worthwhile when the current employer signals a high match.7 Our
model does not involve any fixed costs and highlights the outside firm’s strategic incentive.
There is law and economics literature on non-compete agreements. However, its focus
tends to be on the human capital aspects rather than strategic incentives. Rubin and Shedd
(1981) argue that CNCs should be enforced to protect the employer’s trade secrets but not the
general training investment. Posner and Triantis (2001) point out that, when renegotiation
6The idea is originally due to Fishman (1988), who shows in a corporate takeover setting that the first
bidder can deter the second bidder by oﬀering a preemptivly high bid when its valuation of the target exceeds
a certain threshold.
7The result is that turnover occurs only in the intermediate range of match quality. This seems, however,
diﬃcult to apply to the high-end labor market where the targets are usually well-known, so outside firms
are not likely to be deterred from poaching due to some fixed evaluation costs.
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is possible, CNCs allow the employer to pass general training costs to the new employer, so
that there is an over-investment incentive. In a competitive search model, Moen and Rosén
(2004) show that poaching can reduce the general training provision, but it is constrained
eﬃcient.
Our analysis builds on Lazear (1986) in that we consider a game between two firms and
one worker, and the wage-setting process is modelled as an ascending-price auction. Our
contribution is that we set up a model that links employee movement and product-market
competition and introduce the insights learned from the strategic entry deterrence and exit
literature into this issue (see Ordover and Saloner 1989, and Bolton et al. 2000 for surveys).
The basic argument follows the raising of the rival’s costs literature, and the model under
uncertainty is related to the logic of signaling models of predation.
3 Predatory versus Competitive Hiring
3.1 Full Information
In an oligopoly, poaching a key employee, or a group of them, from a close competitor is likely
to have an impact on firm-level profits beyond individual productivity. For example, hiring
a top manager can boost the profitability of the new employer, whereas it can also damage
the original employer’s ability to compete. Consider a key employee of an entrant firm (E),
where the worker plays a vital role in maintaining the competitive advantage. There is an
incumbent firm (I) competing against the entrant in the product market. The incumbent
can potentially hire away the worker from the entrant.
Let θE ∈ [θL, θH ] measure the worker’s current match with the entrant, and let θI ∈
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[θL, θH ] denote the incumbent’s potential match with this poaching target. When the entrant
hires a replacement, the new match is denoted as θ0E = θE −∆, where ∆ ≥ 0 represents the
quality depreciation. A higher value of θ means a better worker-firm match, which implies
a higher profit other things being equal. In this section, we assume a perfect information
environment where all θ’s are observable. This can be due to the high visibility of the top
talents in the industry with whom employers can easily assess their match.
Without poaching of personnel, each firm expects to receive a gross profit of ΠdE and
ΠdI , respectively, where d denotes the default payoﬀs. Each firm employs only one worker
and initially pays a wage, w◦, which is the market-clearing wage of the relevant labor pool.
However, the incumbent can start a bidding war to poach the entrant’s worker. The wage-
setting process is as follows. The incumbent oﬀers a wage, wI , which the entrant has the
opportunity to match with wE. The worker is simply assumed to choose whichever firm
oﬀers a higher wage.
If the incumbent successfully hires the worker, then the entrant has two options. One is
to exit the market, and the other is to stay in.8 If the entrant exits, then it receives a zero
payoﬀ, whereas the incumbent receives a gross monopoly profit, ΠmI (θI), where Π
m
I (θI)
0 > 0,
that is, the profitability of the monopoly depends positively on its match quality, θI . We
assume that ΠmI (θI) > Π
d
I for all θI , that is, even when the worker is a worst match for the
incumbent, the monopoly profit is larger then the incumbent’s default profit if the wages
were zero.
8Typically, it is claimed that local or smaller companies are driven out of a particular sub-market, defined
either geographically or by the products. For example, “James Pilger lost his full-service salon in Plainview,
N.Y., virtually overnight when his top employees went to work for a competitor. Now he works as a stylist
in another salon.” (New York Times, May 5, 2005)
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If the entrant stays, then it hires a replacement worker, and the two firms’ profits depend
on their match qualities with the respective workers. More specifically, the entrant’s gross
profit, ΠsE(θ
0
E, θI), depends positively on its own match and negatively on the incumbent’s
match, and vice versa for ΠsI(θ
0
E, θI). The monopoly profit is also larger than the incumbent’s
gross profit if the entrant stays, that is, ΠmI (θI) ≥ ΠsI(θ0E, θI) for all θI . Finally, we assume
that for all θ0E, Π
s
E(θ
0
E, θI) < 0 at θI = θH .
9 This is necessary for the existence of predation
in equilibrium.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first period, nature determines θI , θE, and
θ0E. The incumbent decides whether and how much to oﬀer to poach, and the then entrant
decides whether to match the oﬀer. If the incumbent fails to poach, then each gets the
default payoﬀs. If the incumbent hires away the target, then the second period ensues with
the entrant deciding whether to exit or stay. If the entrant stays, then it hires a replacement,
and duopoly profits are realized. The firms pay their wages. In the later section, when non-
compete agreements are considered, the entrant can sue the incumbent regardless of its exit
decision.
Throughout this paper, we assume two tie-breaking rules to simplify the analysis. One
is that the worker stays with the entrant if the entrant matches the outside oﬀer. The other
is that the entrant does not match the oﬀer if it is indiﬀerent between matching and exiting
the market. Since we consider the full information model to present the basic argument,
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept. Essentially, the
entrant has three choices: match the outside oﬀer, exit the market, or replace the worker.
9We are deliberately vague about the particular type of oligopolistic competition. However, the properties
of these profit functions can be justifiable by a large set of models, such as the Cournot model (see the
appendix).
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With perfect foresight about future moves, the incumbent makes an optimal wage oﬀer in
equilibrium.
The purpose of considering this benchmark is to establish the following two results: First,
under perfect information, predation generally exists, but it decreases with the replacement
quality depreciation. Second, even when predation does not occur under full information, it
can drastically occur under imperfect information, which follows in the next section. Here
the predation, or “predatory hiring,” is defined as when the poaching would have been
unprofitable were the entrant to remain viable, that is, ΠsI − wI < ΠdI − w◦.10 Otherwise, it
is called a “competitive poaching.”
Proposition 1. For any θE and ∆, there exist values, θ¯ and θ
0, θ¯ ≤ θ0, such that in
equilibrium the following holds true:
(a) For θI ∈ [θL, θ¯], either the incumbent does not poach, or the incumbent poaches and
the entrant stays.
(b) For θI ∈ [θ¯, θ0], the incumbent does not poach.
(c) For θI ∈ [θ0, θH ], the incumbent poaches and the entrant exits.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the subgame starting at the second period. The
entrant’s profit if it stays is ΠsE(θ
0
E, θI)− w◦. Since ΠsE is decreasing in θI , for any given θE
and ∆, the entrant decides to exit if and only if θI ≥ θ¯, where θ¯ satisfies ΠsE(θ0E, θ¯) = w◦.
Working backward, at the node where the incumbent has made an oﬀer, wI , the entrant
chooses whether to match this oﬀer, wE = wI . Given its future move, the entrant’s optimal
10This is the standard definition in the literature, that is, “a practice is predatory only if the practice
would not be profitable without the additional monopoly power resulting from the exit” (Ordover and Willig
1981).
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decision is to match any oﬀer up to wI < ΠdE if θI ≥ θ¯ and up to wI < ΠdE−(ΠsE(θ0E, θI)−w◦)
if θI < θ¯.
Knowing this entrant’s decision rule, the incumbent moves first by oﬀering wI . First,
consider the case of θI ≥ θ¯. The incumbent would not oﬀer anything more than ΠdE because
by oﬀering wI = ΠdE, the entrant would not match. Let θ
0 be where ΠmI (θ
0) = ΠdE +Π
d
I −w◦.
Then the incumbent would be better oﬀ by oﬀering wI = ΠdE and driving the entrant out
if θI ≥ θ0 since ΠmI (θI) − wI > ΠdI − w◦. If θI < θ0, then the incumbent would not be able
to profitably poach because the payoﬀ would be smaller than ΠdI − w◦ if wI = ΠdE, and the
entrant would match any oﬀer below ΠdE.
Second, consider the case of θI < θ¯. The incumbent would not oﬀer anything more than
ΠdE − (ΠsE(θ0E, θI) − w◦) since the entrant would not match wI = ΠdE − (ΠsE(θ0E, θI) − w◦).
Define a set P = {θI ∈ [θL, θ¯]|ΠsI(θ0E, θI) + ΠsE(θ0E, θI) > ΠdI + ΠdE}. Then if θI ∈ P , then
the incumbent would be better oﬀ by poaching since by construction ΠsI(θ
0
E, θI) − ΠdE +
ΠsE(θ
0
E, θI)− w◦ = ΠsI(θ0E, θI)− wI ≥ ΠdI − w◦. If θI ∈ [θL, θ¯]\P , then the incumbent would
not be able to profitably poach because the payoﬀ would be smaller than ΠdI − w◦ at any
oﬀer wI ≥ ΠdE − (ΠsE(θ0E, θI)− w◦). ¥
The above proposition shows that under perfect information the equilibrium can be
characterized by the intervals of θI , given any values of θE and ∆. When θI is smaller than
a certain threshold, then the entrant stays in the market even if the incumbent hires away
the worker. If θI is suﬃciently high, then the entrant is better oﬀ by exiting and at the
same time the incumbent’s profit increases more than enough to compensate for the higher
poaching wage. If θI is in the intermediate range, then, although it can drive out the entrant
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if it poaches, the poaching wage is too high to profit from the monopolization.
That the incumbent does not poach has two interpretations. One is that the incumbent
abstains from making an oﬀer at all, and the other is that the incumbent makes an oﬀer,
but it is always matched by the entrant’s counteroﬀer. The incumbent would be indiﬀerent
between the two strategies, but in any case the worker will stay with the entrant. Another
issue is whether it is competitive or predatory when the worker does leave the entrant. The
following proposition says that the entrant’s exit is a necessary condition for predatory hiring,
but if the entrant stays after poaching, then it must be a competitive hiring.
Proposition 2. For any θE and ∆, there exist a value θ
00, θ00 ≥ θ0, such that predatory
hiring occurs if θI ∈ [θ0, θ00]. Both θ0 and θ00 are non-increasing in ∆.
Proof of Proposition 2. By definition, predation occurs when the incumbent poaches and
ΠsI(θ
0
E, θI)− wI < ΠdI − w◦. First, suppose θI < θ¯. Then from proposition 1 the incumbent
would be better oﬀ by poaching if θI ∈ P , where it satisfiesΠsI(θ0E, θI)−wI > ΠdI−w◦. Thus, if
θI < θ¯, then poaching must be competitive. Second, suppose θI ≥ θ¯. From proposition 1 the
incumbent would be better oﬀ by poaching if θI ≥ θ0, where θ0 satisfiesΠmI (θ0)−ΠdE = ΠdI−w◦.
Since ΠmI (θI) ≥ ΠsI(θ0E, θI) for all θI , ΠsI(θ0E, θ0) − ΠdE ≤ ΠdI − w◦. Because ΠsI(θ0E, θI) is
increasing in θI , there exist a value θ00, θ00 ≥ θ0, such that ΠsI(θ0E, θ00)−ΠdE = ΠdI −w◦. Thus,
predatory hiring occurs if θI ∈ [θ0, θ00] and competitive poaching occurs if θI ∈ (θ00, θH ].
Suppose that ∆ increases, then the entrant’s new match, θ0E = θE −∆, decreases. Note
that ΠsI(θ
0
E, θI) is decreasing in θ
0
E and increasing in θI . The equation Π
s
E(θ
0
E, θ¯) = w
◦ defines
the value θ¯, and if θ0E decreases, the new θ¯ value must fall. The equation Π
s
I(θ
0
E, θ
00)−ΠdE =
ΠdI − w◦ defines the value θ00, and if θ0E decreases, the new θ00 value must also fall. The
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equation ΠmI (ξ) = Π
d
E + Π
d
I − w◦ defines the value ξ, on which θ0E has no eﬀect. First, if
θ¯ ≤ ξ before ∆ changes, then it must be θ¯ < ξ after ∆ changes, so that θ0 = ξ, which is
invariant to ∆. Second, if ξ < θ¯ before ∆ changes, then there exists small enough value ∆
such that ξ < θ¯ after ∆ changes. This means θ0 = θ¯, which is decreasing in ∆. ¥
Since θ0 is greater than or equal to θ¯, which is the threshold for the entrant’s exit,
predatory hiring must be followed by the entrant’s exit. In particular, the values of θI
for which predation occurs are relatively lower values (i.e., θI < θ
00) conditional on the
incumbent’s poaching action. This is intuitive because if the incumbent’s match is very
high (i.e., θI > θ
00), then the incumbent would still have preferred to poach even if the
entrant were to stay in the market. On the other hand, since θ¯ ≤ θ0, it follows that even if
the incumbent poaches when θI ≤ θ¯, the entrant stays and hires a replacement, which by
definition is competitive poaching.
However, the comparative statics result regarding the eﬀect of ∆ has a more subtle
implication. Since both the lower and the upper bound for predatory hiring decreases as
∆ increases, the range of θI values for which predation occurs may shrink or expand. In
particular, this means that, when the entrant’s replacement quality depreciates, predation
could decrease. This is because, when θ0E depreciates at the upper margin, θ
00, poaching
becomes competitive, and at the same time the entrant is driven out of the market at the
lower margin, θ0. When the latter eﬀect is smaller than the former, predation reduces when
θ0E depreciates.
This seems a little counterintuitive, but it can be explained by the logic of raising the
rival’s costs argument. That is, if the entrant’s replacement is of lower quality, then poach-
13
ing tends to be more profitable even if the entrant survives and replaces the worker. The
incumbent raises the entrant’s costs of replacing the worker without necessarily causing more
exit. When the replacement is relatively more competitive, poaching conditional on the exit
can be more predatory in the sense that the incumbent would have fared less well were the
entrant to stay in the market and hire the replacement.
3.2 Uncertainty
In this sub-section, we assume that the worker-firm match qualities are initially the firms’
private information, but an employer’s match quality is revealed to outside firms once the
employment relationship is established. In terms of our model, the entrant’s match θE with
the worker is revealed to the incumbent, whereas the incumbent’s match θI with the potential
hire is unknown to the entrant. This may be because poaching targets by definition tend
to be high-profile visible figures of the firm whom the outside firms already accumulated
enough information about.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the entrant’s replacement match θ0E is still pub-
lic information and only consider one-sided uncertainty on θI . This is because the incumbent
moves first and then the entrant second, so that uncertain ∆ does not fundamentally change
the analysis.11 That is, even if there is some uncertainty regarding ∆, no information is
updated when the incumbent moves at the beginning. Rather, we assume that that θI is a
random draw from a distribution F with support on [θl, θh], which implies that the entrant
11More specifically, suppose that the players can make small mistakes in figuring out the exact value of
∆, so that the players’ payoﬀs are perturbed and the equilibrium strategies are ε-constrained. Then by
a well-known result, the extensive-form trembling hand perfect equilibrium is the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium (Selten 1975).
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updates its belief about the incumbent’s type conditional on wage oﬀer, wI .
With uncertain θI , the entrant could decide to exit at a lower threshold than under
perfect information. To illustrate the argument, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is adopted
as the solution concept. The equilibria is of the following form: If the incumbent’s match
quality is above a certain threshold, θ∗, then the incumbent poaches the entrant’s worker. If
it is below the threshold, then the entrant either matches the oﬀer or replaces the worker.
That is, the information signaled by the incumbent’s poaching wage oﬀer leads the entrant
to believe that it would be better oﬀ by exiting.
Proposition 3. There exist a threshold value θ∗ and an associated wage oﬀer w∗ such
that in equilibrium the incumbent oﬀers w∗ if θI ≥ θ∗ and the entrant exits.
Proof of Proposition 3. The entrant’s decision at the information set reached at the
second period is characterized by its belief on the incumbent’s type and its expected profit.
In particular, the entrant’s exit is a threshold rule on the equilibrium path where the entrant
would be induced to exit by the belief that θI ∈ [θ∗, θH ] and
R θH
θ∗ Π
s
E(θ
0
E, θI)
f(θI)
1−F (θ∗)dθI ≤ 0.
This is because if there were two disjointed belief sets, [θ∗, θ1] and [θ2, θH ], where the entrant
exits, then it should also exit if θI ∈ [θ∗ + (θ2 − θ1), θH ], which increases the incumbent’s
payoﬀ. Since the profit expectation is decreasing in θ∗, there exists a zero expected profit
threshold θ˙, such that for any θ∗ ≥ θ˙ the entrant will be induced to exit by the belief that
θI ∈ [θ∗, θH ].
For this to be an equilibrium strategy, the incumbent must make an oﬀer that the entrant
cannot match and also must be better oﬀ by inducing the entrant’s exit. Since the entrant
knows that it will exit if the incumbent oﬀers w∗, the incumbent must oﬀer at least ΠdE to
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outbid the entrant’s counteroﬀer. However, it may have to bid more than ΠdE. Let Θ denote
where ΠmI (Θ) − ΠdE = ΠdI − w◦. There are two cases to consider. First, if θ˙ < Θ, then the
incumbent will not want to oﬀer w∗ = ΠdE for θI ∈ [θ˙,Θ]; θ∗ ≥ Θ in equilibrium. Second,
if θ˙ > Θ, then the incumbent for which θI ∈ [Θ, θ˙] must be discouraged from poaching, so
that the equilibrium wage oﬀer increases to w∗ = ΠmI (θ˙)−ΠdI + w◦; θ∗ ≥ θ˙ in equilibrium.
Then this is indeed profitable for the incumbent since for all θI ≥ θ∗, ΠmI (θI) − w∗ ≥
ΠmI (Θ)−ΠdE = ΠdI−w◦ in the first case, and for all θI ≥ θ∗, ΠmI (θI)−w∗ ≥ ΠmI (θ˙)−(ΠmI (θ˙)−
ΠdI + w
◦) = ΠdI − w◦ in the second case. Finally, for the entrant’s oﬀ-the-equilibrium belief,
there is no restriction, but it can be any belief such that the entrant exits if wI > w∗ and
stays if wI < w∗. For example, for any oﬀ-the-equilibrium oﬀer wI > w∗, the entrant’s belief
is that θI ∈ [θ∗0, θH ] where θ∗0 > θ∗, and for any non-equilibrium wI < w∗ the entrant’s belief
is that θI ∈ [θ∗00, θH ] where θ∗00 < θ˙. ¥
Thus, a threshold match quality, θ∗, and a poaching wage oﬀer, w∗, characterize an
equilibrium of the model with uncertainty. Since the equilibrium concept does not put
any restrictions on the entrant’s belief oﬀ the equilibrium path, there is a multiplicity of
equilibrium threshold θ∗. However, a refinement may intuitively focus on the equilibrium
that is most profitable for the incumbent. Since the incumbent first moves by making an
oﬀer, it seems reasonable that the entrant expects that the incumbent will poach in the most
profitable manner whenever it can, so that the unique equilibrium selects the minimum
threshold.
Grossman and Perry (1986)’s credible belief refinement does exactly this. Then the
following result establishes that in this unique equilibrium predation can occur even when
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it would not occur under perfect information other things being equal. The reason is that
at the minimum threshold the entrant’s profit would have been strictly positive if it were to
stay. This implies that the incumbent’s profit in such cases tends to be lower than its current
payoﬀ, making predation more likely. This widens the possibility of strategic poaching that
a less well-matched rival poaches a better-matched employer to induce exit.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium with credible belief is the perfect equilibrium with the
minimum threshold, θ˙. In that unique equilibrium, predation can occur even when it cannot
under full information.
Proof of Proposition 4. According to Grossman and Perry’s definition, the entrant’s
optimal strategy at the second-period information sets needs to be specified for any possible
beliefs. Being the last one to move, the entrant’s exit decision is to exit if and only if the
belief is such that θI ∈ [θ3, θH ] where θ3 ≥ θ˙. Suppose that the incumbent has made an
oﬀer w∗. For θI ∈ [θ˙, θH ], the incumbent would be better oﬀ to poach if the entrant exits.
Consequently, the entrant puts zero weight on θI ∈ [θL, θ˙] upon observing w∗. On the other
hand, if this is the entrant’s belief, then it would exit, and this choice indeed makes it
profitable for the incumbent θI ∈ [θ˙, θH ] to poach.
It follows that the only consistent belief at the entrant’s information set is to put zero
weight on θI ∈ [θL, θ˙]. Hence, the entrant’s only possible choice is to exit if it observes w∗.
As for the incumbent’s strategy, it must be a best response to the entrant’s action. As the
entrant’s credible belief is as above, this establishes the minimum threshold as the unique
equilibrium. If there is no predation under full information, then it suﬃces to consider θ¯ = θ00
from above. Suppose also Θ < θ¯ from above. With uncertainty, one can take a threshold
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θ∗ such that Θ < θ∗ < θ¯. Then by definition predation exists where θI ∈ [θ∗, θ00]. Since the
minimum threshold θ˙ is smaller than θ∗, it follows that the predation occurs with an even
larger probability in the unique equilibrium. ¥
4 Non-compete Enforcement
4.1 Analysis
Note that in our model, when the incumbent poaches the worker, its intention is either
predatory or competitive. This means in particular that even if the entrant is driven out
of the market, it is not necessarily a predation. The discussion in this section on antitrust
claims is therefore mainly concerned with the range of θI values where predation occurs,
and how the courts might be able to reduce this range. Since the above two models yield
basically the same equilibrium characterization, except for the diﬀerences in the threshold
level, the following results go through in both cases.
In the model under full information, consider the possibility that, if the incumbent hires
away the worker, the entrant can sue the incumbent on the basis of non-compete agree-
ments.12 Non-compete clauses may or may not be enforceable, and we consider two types of
legal enforcement of post-employment non-compete agreements. First, in the case of grant-
ing injunctive reliefs, the court can prevent the worker to a varying degree from assuming
relevant duties at the new firm. We assume that in such a case the incumbent’s match with
the worker decreases by γ ≥ 0.13
12The employer can also sue on the basis of business tort claims that the competitor used unfair or
deceptive means to injure its business. However, the success of such claims often depends on the validity of
the restrictive covenant itself (Anensonn 2005).
13An injunction cannot forbid the worker from leaving the employer. The doctrine of specific performance
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Second, the courts can also award monetary damages, D, that the incumbent must
pay to the entrant, with some commonly known probability q. For our purpose, only the
expected penalty, d ≡ qD, would matter. This can also be a “pay-back” system designed
to transfer d, or even the expected settlement through private negotiation.14 The following
result is intuitive. As long as both parties rationally take into account the expected transfer
by internalizing it into their wage bid and counteroﬀer, there is no eﬀect on the range of
predation probability.
Proposition 5. Enforcement of CNC in the form of monetary damages does not aﬀect the
probability of predatory hiring.
Proof of Proposition 5. Regardless of its exit decision, the entrant expects to gain d
additionally. For example, the exit decision is based on the zero-profit condition, ΠsE(θ
0
E, θI)−
w◦ + d ≤ d, so the same threshold applies, θ¯d = θ¯, where the superscript d means the case
of damage awards. First, conditional on the entrant’s exit, the incumbent poaches when
ΠmI (θI) − wdI − d > ΠdI − w◦. Note that the entrant’s maximum willingness to match is
ΠdE − d, so that wdI = ΠdE − d. Thus, the threshold θ0d = θ0 remains unchanged. Second,
poaching is predatory if ΠsI(θ
0
E, θI)−wdI − d < ΠdI −w◦. For the same reason, the threshold
θ00d = θ00 remains unchanged. ¥
The monetary sanction increases the original employer’s profit by d conditional on poach-
ing, thus, in a sense compensates the loss of the key employee to the competitor. However,
holds that the law will not force the worker to continue to work for the old employer in the case of breach
of labor contract.
14Due to the courts’ deep-rooted hostility towards the restraints of trade, some states (e.g., Colorado,
Florida, and Louisiana) have proposed and statutorily authorized employers to require “pay-back” agree-
ments that employees who depart within a certain duration of hire repay the cost of their training.
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since, when the incumbent’s oﬀer decreases, the entrant’s counteroﬀer also decreases, the
payment is irrelevant to the decisions at the margin. Essentially, CNC in this case allows the
incumbent to hire away the worker at a lower wage by committing to kick back the wedge
to the entrant in the form of monetary awards. The entrant may benefit from such system,
but it does not address the antitrust concerns.
Instead, the courts can consider issuing an injunction to reduce the range of predatory
hiring. Let γ be the extent of such restrictions on tasks that can be performed, or information
and skills that can be used at the new employment. Since the incumbent’s match quality
decreases to θI − γ, this aﬀects the threshold values, and to be specific it increases all
thresholds by γ. This implies that uniform enforcement of CNC has no eﬀect on the measure
of preying firms, either. That is, if the courts enforce CNC in all cases, then this induces
additional predatory hiring at the high margin although it also prevents some predation at
the low margin.
Instead, a selective enforcement of CNC can be more useful. A selective enforcement is
formally defined as γ = 0 if θI ∈ [θ00, θH ], and γ > 0 otherwise. This can be implemented in
a two-step process: First, conditional on exit, the court should discern between predatory
versus competitive cases. Second, the court issues injunctions only in predatory cases. This
procedure resembles the current legal practice, but it is diﬀerent in substance as we explain
below. In the case of uncertainty, the following result also goes through. The diﬀerence is
that with uncertainty uniform enforcement may even increase the predation probability.
Proposition 6. Selective enforcement of CNC in the form of injunctive relief reduces the
probability of predatory.
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Proof of Proposition 6. Let θγI ≡ θI − γ denote the incumbent’s match, where the
superscript γ means the case of injunctions. Then the threshold for the entrant’s exit is
based on the zero-profit condition, ΠsE(θ
0
E, θ
γ
I )−w◦ = 0. Since θ
γ
I = θ¯, the new exit threshold
for θγI is θ¯
γ
= θ¯ + γ. Conditional on θγI > θ¯
γ, γ does not aﬀect the entrant’s maximum
willingness to match. Thus, the incumbent poaches when ΠmI (θ
γ
I ) − w
γ
I > Π
d
I − w◦, where
wγI = Π
d
E. The new threshold is higher exactly by γ, i.e., θ
0γ = θ0+ γ. Poaching is predatory
if ΠsI(θ
0
E, θ
γ
I )− w
γ
I < Π
d
I − w◦. Since w
γ
I = Π
d
E, the new threshold is again higher exactly by
γ, i.e., since θγI = θ
00, θ00γ = θ00+ γ. Then it is straightforward that the selective enforcement
would increase θ¯γ and θ0γ, while θ00γ is held constant. ¥
4.2 Antitrust Implications
Employers have brought claims against defecting employees and their new employers under
both federal antitrust law and state common law, alleging that the former employee and the
competing firm engaged in unfair competition with the intent to eliminate the competition.
The most cited precedent is the Pick-Barth doctrine (1932), where the court found such
conspiracy a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Since then, however, antitrust
claims have been considered only in limited circumstances where the elimination of the former
employer was the primary intent of the poacher.
For example, in duPont Walston, Inc. v. E. F. Hutton & Company, Inc. (1973) and in
Tower Tire and Auto Center, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1975), the courts found that a
mere conspiracy to cripple the rival’s business did not amount to a per se antitrust violation.
That is, it is not enough that the poacher had a clear intent to injure the employer, but the
plaintiﬀs must prove that the primary intent was to eliminate them completely. This had
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a chilling eﬀect on antitrust claims, but the claims have been used to subsequently achieve
injunctions or favorable settlements (Janssen 1976).
In Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp. (1990), the Ninth Circuit
re-examined the predatory hiring claim, that is, that the competing firm aimed to destroy
the employer’s business by hiring away its key employees. The court strictly adhered to the
‘sole-purpose test’ again stating that as long as the employees are put to work, then it cannot
be seen as having the sole purpose of gaining or maintaining the monopoly power but also
recruiting skilled workers for itself (Bui-Eve 1997). Reflecting on our analysis, the current
judicial standard seems to underestimate the strategic predation possibilities.
That is, poaching of key personnel not only injures the former employer due to the
imperfect substitutes, but it can also lead the employer to leave the market because the
initial employer sees that the poaching firm with its former employee would outperform
them, so that it is better oﬀ by exiting. In practice, it might be easy to pass the sole-purpose
test by simply putting the worker to some work, which is the case in our model. Such a test
to refute antitrust claims can significantly downplay the predatory intent of the poaching
firms.
The courts’ injunction seemingly provides a clear-cut remedy for the original employer
being preyed upon. However, the current judicial criteria for granting an injunction is
basically that the former employee has some trade secrets of the initial employer, which
if revealed would seriously damage its business. Thus, the courts’ rationale of issuing an
injunction is to protect the investment in valuable assets. This is substantively diﬀerent
from our analysis, which is mainly based on the worker-firm match qualities regardless of
the possession of trade secret.
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Possessing the former employer’s confidential information does not necessarily mean that
the new worker-firm match is bad, which makes predation more likely. Instead, our strategic
model shows the possibility that conditional on exiting if the new match is bad, then it could
be predation even without trade secrets. Hence, the focus or the judgement criteria in the
first step of the selective enforcement should be on the relative matches. This suggest some
additional evidence to look for when the courts try to discern predatory from competitive
cases
As the Ninth Circuit held in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. (1989), significant
monetary rewards not commensurate to the employee’s skills can be circumstantial evidence
of predatory hiring, and there may be other set of facts that are more consistent with
predatory hiring than competitive poaching. In our model, excessive compensation could
occur because the firms are bidding on the worker’s wages based on his leverage on firm-
level profits rather than paying on the basis of individual merit. However, this behavior is
consistent with both types of employee poaching.
Our analysis suggests that if the new match is substantially less than the previous match,
then conditional on the entrant’s exit, the incumbent is likely to have preyed. For example,
if the entrant is driven out of the market and the incumbent is not doing great, for example,
in terms of profits, then it is an indication of a poor match. Similarly, if the worker is put
to work on unrelated tasks, demoted, or fired subsequent to the exit, then it could serve as
evidence of predation. Thus, unless the incumbent has some clear reason to value the worker
much more than the former employer, antitrust concerns should be given more consideration.
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5 Conclusion
Employee poaching in highly skilled labor markets has been a growing concern for many
industries. Society must not obstruct the eﬃcient flow of workers to where their skills are
most productive, but at the same time it should be concerned about the potential damages
from predatory hiring. This goes beyond the traditional tradeoﬀ between the freedom to
change jobs and the protection of proprietary information. Just as the economic literature
on predatory pricing has shed light on competition policy, the courts may benefit from
strategic models of predatory hiring and post-employment restrictions.
This paper emphasizes the role of match qualities between the worker and his current and
prospective employers. We have shown that a less well-matched incumbent can poach the
key employees of the entrant in order to drive the entrant out of the market. This is because
imperfect substitution of key personnel raises the entrant’s costs, which induces the exit. This
problem is exacerbated with the uncertainty over the potential match. Restrictive injunctions
can reduce potential antitrust injuries provided that the courts put forth a reasonable eﬀort
to screen predatory from competitive hiring.
6 Appendix
Cournot Model. Suppose that two firms, A and B, are Cournot competitors, and a higher
match quality represents a lower constant marginal cost of production, e.g., c = 1θ . Let
θ ∈ (1,∞), so that c ∈ (0, 1). Assuming the demand function, P = 1−Q, it is straightforward
to show πa =
¡
1+cb−2ca
3
¢2
and πb =
¡
1+ca−2cb
3
¢2
if 2ca − 1 ≤ cb ≤ 1+ca2 ; πa =
¡
1−ca
2
¢2
and
πb = 0 if 1+ca2 < cb; and πa = 0 and πb =
¡
1−cb
2
¢2
if cb < 2ca − 1. Thus, πa is nondecreasing
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in cb, or nonincreasing in θb, and vice versa for πb. Also, for an appropriately chosen range
of avoidable fixed-cost parameter F , it must be that lim
θb→∞
πa(θb) < 0 and lim
θb→1
πa(θb) > 0.
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